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Abstract  
In line with psychological and economic discrimination theories, street-level bureaucracy 
studies show a direct effect of citizen characteristics on officials’ judgments, or show how 
street-level bureaucrats employ stereotypical reasoning in making decisions. Relying on 
sociological double standards theory, this study hypothesizes that citizen-clients’ status 
characteristics not only directly influence officials’ evaluations, but also indirectly and more 
pervasively by influencing the interpretation of other signals. By means of a policy-capturing 
study among Dutch frontline tax officials, this study takes a first step in testing double standards 
propositions in the context of official-citizen encounters. The findings support only some 
hypotheses, but indicate that citizen-clients’ level of education could serve as a moderating 
context affecting the interpretation of cues. The article provides important theoretical and 
methodological guidelines for future research on stereotyping at the frontline.  
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Introduction 
Street-level bureaucrats typically have considerable leeway to make judgments about citizen-
clients (Lipsky 1980). Research on street-level bureaucrats, such as police officers or teachers, 
has shown how discretionary judgments sometimes overlap with citizens’ supposed belonging 
to certain social groups, such as someone’s race (e.g. Epp et al. 2014), social class (Harrits and 
Møller 2014), or gender (Johnson and Morgan 2013). It has been shown that, due to a lack of 
information, time and other resources, street-level bureaucrats develop shortcuts such as 
stereotypes to categorize clients (Lipsky 1980; Prottas 1979). In situations with only limited 
information and time pressure, the matching of citizen characteristics to stereotypes gives 
officials information they would otherwise not have (e.g. Maynard-Moody and Musheno 2003). 
 
Within the public administration literature there is a lack of explanatory studies focusing on 
how cultural beliefs about social groups play a role in the public encounter, and affect the 
judgments of frontline officials (but see Andersen and Guul 2016; Harrits and Møller 2014; 
Schram et al. 2009). This is particularly interesting given the fact that frontline officials are 
encouraged to be flexible and to be responsive to citizens’ situations when making decisions 
(e.g. Rice 2017). In fact, interpersonal notions as trust and collaboration have come to play an 
important role in frontline decisions (Bartels 2013; Yang 2005). In such contexts, officials have 
more room for interpretation, and leeway in using their own standards to assess who is 
trustworthy and who is not. Therefore, this flexibility paves the way for stereotyped images and 
double standards to inform judgments.  
 
The sociological status characteristics theory holds that in situations entailing interpersonal task 
situations, where there is a distinction between ‘failure’ and ‘success’, evaluators look at 
people’s status characteristics to evaluate their likely behavior and achievements (Berger et al. 
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1972). These characteristics are socially recognized attributes on which people are perceived to 
differ, such as ethnicity, gender or education. Status characteristics are associated with ‘cultural 
beliefs of greater competence in those with more valued states of the characteristic’ (Ridgeway 
1991, p. 368). As a consequence, it is held, similar situations implying equal competences, are 
evaluated differently for lower status groups than for higher status groups. By testing the 
explanatory power of double standards theory using a policy-capturing design, this article sets 
out to examine how stereotyping at the frontline may be more indirect (i.e. also indirectly 
leading to unequal judgments) and pervasive (i.e. affecting the interpretation of other signals) 
than is hitherto studied within public administration research. This study thereby provides a 
first step in testing the explanatory potential of double standards theory in a public 
administration context.  
 
In what follows, we will discuss previous research on stereotyping in frontline work more 
broadly. We will subsequently present our theoretical framework, describe the research setting 
and formulate hypotheses. Then we will describe our policy-capturing design and discuss our 
findings.  
 
Stereotyping at the frontline  
The literature on stereotyping at the frontline is diverse and entails different perspectives on 
stereotyping. Notwithstanding the differences, most of these studies focus on direct ways of 
stereotyping, i.e. how evaluations are affected by stereotypes or based on stereotypical 
reasoning.  
 
In line with the economic theory of statistical discrimination, there are studies that assume that 
the use of stereotypes is based on statistical knowledge or prior experience to reduce uncertainty 
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(e.g. Gambetta and Hamill 2005; Harris 1999). Studies show how service workers in general or 
officials within certain professions explicitly construct types of clients that are inextricably 
linked to certain groupings in society. Stroshine et al. (2008) for example, show how police 
officers find black people driving in dilapidated cars in white neighborhoods suspicious. Within 
such studies, the mechanism of discrimination studied is direct: cues lead people do distinguish 
between social categories regardless of any other relevant characteristics. Observational studies 
that point to the stereotypical reasoning employed by frontline workers in reaching decisions 
(e.g. Maynard-Moody and Musheno 2003; Dubois 2010) also fall in this category, since they 
point to how differential evaluations of for instance deservingness overlap with distinctions 
between social groups.  
 
Within the street-level bureaucracy literature there are only some studies that focus on indirect 
mechanisms of stereotyping. A study by Harrits and Møller (2014) shows how social workers’ 
tendency to suggest interventions in similar situations is different for low and high class citizens 
than for middle class citizens. Drawing on the sociological literature on normality and 
categorization, they find some evidence that the social distance between workers and citizen-
clients in interactions implicitly influences their judgments. Moreover, the experimental 
vignette study by Schram et al. (2009) on case managers’ decisions to impose sanctions, shows 
that black welfare clients are more likely to be punished than white welfare clients when rules 
have been violated. They test the Racial Classification Model (RCM), a model they developed 
themselves, to explain how a client’s race affects officials’ evaluations of rule violations. The 
RCM posits that when cues are confirming negative racial stereotypes, this can provide 
expectancy confirmation, thereby reinforcing negative stereotypes in evaluators’ minds. As 
such, that study also tested and provided evidence for an indirect mechanism of stereotyping. 
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Apart from these studies, there is little attention within the public administration literature for  
indirect mechanisms of stereotyping. Our study builds on these studies by testing propositions 
of the double standards theory to explain how stereotypes may also work as frames affecting 
officials’ interpretation of similar evidence. Just like the RCM, double standards theory holds 
that negative cues are interpreted stricter for social groups which have a more negative status 
in society. The double standards theory, however, differs from the RCM in several respects. 
First, the double standards theory has a broader scope and not only offers explanations for 
stereotyping based on race, but also on other characteristics, such as gender and social class. 
Second, whereas the RCM only focuses on ‘discrediting markers’, double standards theory also 
offers explanations for how positive cues could be evaluated stricter for lower status groups 
than for higher status groups. Double standards theory, thus, has a broader applicability and 
offers explanations for stereotypical evaluations of both stereotype-consistent and stereotype-
inconsistent cues.  
 
Theoretical framework 
In order to test if and how status characteristics affect the interpretation of other signals, we 
draw on the status characteristics theory and double standards theory. These theories of status-
based discrimination have their origin in the sociology of work, where they have been tested to 
explain why certain groups are privileged in attaining positions and rewards over other groups 
in society (e.g. Wagner and Berger 1993). Status characteristics theory has been depicted by 
Wagner and Berger (1993) as a program of interrelated theories, aimed at explaining aspects of 
status-based discrimination in social interaction.  
 
Double standards theory extends status characteristics theory by proposing that status 
characteristics affect the standards evaluators use to determine other people’s ability (Correll 
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and Benard 2006; Foschi 2000). The basic assumption is that standards are stricter for lower 
status groups than for higher status groups (Foschi 2000). As performance expectations for low 
status groups are lower than for high status groups, a high performance of a low status actor 
will be inconsistent with the expectations for lower status actors. As a result, double standards 
theory holds, standards will be stricter for lower status actors, i.e. they will be more critically 
scrutinized in this situation. A woman with three children and an outstanding CV, for example, 
will be looked at with suspicion, because it does not correspond to the lower expectations people 
have of mothers in the workplace. Employers are inclined, for instance, to look for evidence 
that disproves the achievements of this person. The opposite also holds: as equally high 
performance is consistent with performance expectations for high status actors, the consistency 
between observation and expectation will lead to a more lenient standard (Correll and Benard 
2006). A man with three children and an outstanding CV, in this case, is not inconsistent with 
the high expectations people usually have of men in the workplace. As a consequence, 
employers will accept that person’s portrayal of his CV more easily, without looking for more 
evidence of his competence.  
 
Standards of both competence and incompetence can be distinguished. A strict standard for 
competence requires more evidence than a lenient one, whereas a strict standard for 
incompetence accepts less evidence of incompetence than a lenient standard (Foschi 2000). The 
latter means that cues indicating low competence are more easily accepted for a lower status 
person than a higher status person, because they are consistent with the low expectations of the 
lower status group’s competence and inconsistent with the high expectations of higher status 
group’s competence. To sum up, the theory holds that both cues signaling low competence and 
cues signaling high competence are evaluated stricter for lower status groups than for higher 
status groups.  
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This article examines whether tax officials use double standards in evaluating various cues from 
entrepreneurs from different social groups. In what follows, we will describe our research 
setting, contextualize the theoretical propositions, and present our hypotheses.  
 
The Dutch tax administration  
This study focuses on frontline tax officials inspecting the bookkeeping records of small and 
medium sized enterprises. Under the heading of the so-called ‘horizontal supervision’ approach, 
the Dutch tax administration has embraced responsiveness and trust towards entrepreneurs as 
essential ingredient for compliance (Gribnau 2007). This horizontal policy encourages officials 
to assess tax returns on their acceptability, rather than their mere correctness. This means that 
officials are encouraged to collect ‘sufficient’ information to make a judgment, and have ‘to do 
enough work, but not too much’ (Belastingdienst 2016, p. 4). This practically means that 
officials are encouraged not to start their inspection with the assumption that it will probably 
be wrong, not to do their utmost to find even the smallest flaws, and not to enforce the maximum 
financial correction when it has been found that entrepreneurs just made a mistake and express 
their goodwill to change. As a consequence, assessments of entrepreneurs’ intentions and 
competences are part and parcel of tax officials’ judgments. The standards to assess tax returns, 
thus, have become less predetermined, and more dependent on officials’ assessments. 
 
Tax officials’ evaluations of entrepreneurs’ trustworthiness is central to this study. In 
determining the acceptability of entrepreneurs’ tax returns, tax officials look at what is presented 
to them in terms of bookkeeping records, but also at whether entrepreneurs are trustworthy, in 
order to make inferences about the credibility of what is presented. They generally look at two 
aspects of trustworthiness – intentions and competences – to look at whether some sort of fraud 
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might be involved, or whether they are dealing with a mere fault. This, in turn, influences 
officials’ willingness to reach a compromise, and the height of the possible fine. Within this study, 
we aim to cover both the evaluation of the trust that can be vested in the entrepreneur, as the 
evaluation of the enterprise as a whole, since these are the core evaluations tax officials make in 
their daily work. We are furthermore interested in tax officials’ intention to more critically 
scrutinize the case at hand, since this is the main decision determining whether officials will 
intensify their inspection or not. 
 
In this study, the focus is on the effect of status characteristics on the interpretation of signals 
indicating low or high quality of the bookkeeping and interaction. The status characteristics 
focused on are entrepreneurs’ social class and level of education. A prior study on tax officials 
has suggested these attributes play a role in frontline tax officials’ evaluations (Raaphorst and 
Groeneveld 2015). Whereas these characteristics tend to overlap, they are often mentioned 
separately by tax officials. The findings indicated that these characteristics carry along specific 
expectations regarding entrepreneurs’ intentions and competences. These characteristics are 
moreover associated with more generic cultural beliefs that are shared by society at large. 
Lower educated people are viewed as generally less competent than higher educated people. 
Although level of education is generally perceived as a legitimate ground to distinguish job 
applicants, its relevance to street-level law enforcement is less obvious. Furthermore, lower 
social classes are generally perceived as less competent and in need of help (e.g. Harrits and 
Møller 2014). These status characteristics are likely to influence officials when they need to 
assess intentions and competences.  
 
This study distinguishes two sources of attributes which serve as independent variables. Besides 
looking at characteristics of the bookkeeping records, and in particular how this is presented, 
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H1 
H2a                       H2b 
tax officials also take into account entrepreneurs’ demeanor in the interaction to assess whether 
the tax return is acceptable, i.e. whether what is presented and found is credible (Raaphorst and 
Groeneveld 2015). For this reason we distinguish quality of the bookkeeping and quality of the 
interaction as determinants of officials’ judgments.  
 
Hypotheses 
Within this section we formulate two sets of hypotheses. The first concerns the influence of the 
quality of the bookkeeping and the quality of the interaction on officials’ evaluations. Secondly, 
we will discuss our hypotheses on the moderating effect of entrepreneurs’ status characteristics 
on officials’ evaluation of quality of bookkeeping and interaction signals. Figure 1 portrays the 
conceptual model and the corresponding hypotheses.  
 
Figure 1. Conceptual model with hypotheses  
 
 
‘’  
 
 
 
The street-level bureaucracy literature and the literature on regulatory encounters provides 
evidence that street-level officials not only look at characteristics related to their core task, but 
also at how citizens behave in the interaction to make judgments (Maynard-Moody and 
Musheno 2003). The latter authors show how street-level bureaucrats rather respond to co-
operative citizen-clients than to manipulative and over-demanding citizens. Nielsen (2007) 
shows that the higher the level of communication (in frequency and quality), the more lenient 
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an inspector is. Therefore, we expect that the higher both the quality of the bookkeeping and 
the interaction, the more positive officials’ evaluations will be.  
 
H1: Cues indicating a good quality of bookkeeping and a good quality of interaction will 
have a more positive effect on officials’ evaluation of trustworthiness and overall 
situation, and will have a more negative effect on officials’ inclination to more critically 
scrutinize the entrepreneur, than cues indicating a bad quality.  
 
Secondly, we formulate hypotheses for the indirect mechanism, which is this study’s particular 
contribution to the public administration literature on frontline stereotyping. Based on our 
previous exploratory study (Raaphorst and Groeneveld 2015) we expect that frontline tax 
officials may use double standards to evaluate entrepreneurs. That study has suggested that 
differential evaluations are based on cultural beliefs about professions involving either manual 
or mental labor, about different levels of education and different ‘classes’ in society. An 
example mentioned within this study is the differential evaluation of ‘wrongly declared turnover 
tax´: a ‘high-level’ mayor, it is held, is to blame, since he should have known, whereas a 
shoemaker is not to blame, because he is just incompetent. Another respondent distinguishes 
status groups according to their alleged intentions, and argues that residents of mobile homes 
cannot and do not want to keep their records properly, whereas manual workers simply do not 
have the skills. Another example is that of the lower educated entrepreneurs who are assigned 
bad intentions in case of wrongly kept records, whereas the intentions of a higher educated 
entrepreneur in a similar situation are described as good intentions that have gone bad (ibid.).  
 
These findings thus suggest that double standards are used, but they are less straightforward 
about the directions in which these work. In some instances, the higher status entrepreneur is 
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evaluated stricter, whereas in other instances the lower status entrepreneur is evaluated stricter. 
This could be due to the qualitative and exploratory nature of that study, which did not allow 
us to keep constant research conditions. In this current study the independent variables will be 
manipulated, allowing us to better assess the validity of double standards theory. In line with 
double standards theory and the findings of our previous study, we expect that entrepreneurs’ 
level of education and social class serve as moderating contexts, influencing the strength and 
possibly also the direction of the effects of signals on officials’ evaluations. Our previous study 
has shown that a lower level of education is often associated with diminished expectations about 
entrepreneurs’ competence (Raaphorst and Groeneveld 2015). Therefore, we expect that the 
same situation is evaluated stricter  (i.e. more negatively) for lower educated entrepreneurs than 
for higher educated entrepreneurs: 
 
H2a: Cues of both quality of bookkeeping and quality of interaction will be evaluated 
stricter for the lower educated entrepreneurs than for the higher educated entrepreneurs.  
 
Moreover, tax officials sometimes associate entrepreneurs from a lower social class not only 
with lower levels of competence, but also with bad intentions; i.e. entrepreneurs who try to 
withhold tax money (ibid.). Bookkeeping records that seem acceptable at first sight, then, could 
also be feigned. It is likely that such suspicions about social class influence the interpretation 
of other signals. For this reason, we expect a moderating impact of social class on the effect of 
quality of bookkeeping and quality of interaction cues as follows:  
 
H2b: Cues of both quality of bookkeeping and quality of interaction will be evaluated 
stricter for entrepreneurs from a lower social class than for entrepreneurs from a higher 
social class.  
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Based on hypotheses 2a and 2b we thus expect that similar scenarios will be more negatively 
evaluated for entrepreneurs with a lower level of education and from a lower social class than 
entrepreneurs with a higher level of education and from a higher social class.  
 
The policy-capturing study  
To examine whether officials evaluate similar evidence differently for entrepreneurs from 
different status groups, this study conducted a policy-capturing study. The policy-capturing 
design allows for studying how decision makers use information in evaluative judgments 
(Aiman-Smith et al. 2002). It involves letting respondents judge a relatively large set of 
hypothetical, but realistic scenarios in a row, with each scenario being composed of a distinct 
combination of cue values. Subsequently, respondents’ evaluations are regressed on the cue 
values, which enables researchers to assess the relative weight of the various cues in 
evaluations. 
 
We chose for a policy-capturing design because it allows for the study of stereotyping by 
officials in a context that resembles real-life decision making. Policy-capturing studies are 
typically more realistic than laboratory experiments where respondents are removed from their 
natural environments and typically evaluate only one scenario (Aguinis and Bradley 2014). 
Whereas classical experiments measure officials’ first stereotypical reactions, the question 
remains whether these studies actually capture officials’ judgments in work situations or rather 
first impressions they share with other people in general. The policy-capturing method has 
better external validity, because it allows respondents to adjust their evaluations to prior 
evaluations.  Evaluating various cases is what tax officials do on a weekly basis. Decisions 
about these cases are not made in a vacuum, but compared to each other. Policy-capturing 
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studies thus resemble officials’ actual work situations better, since such designs allow for 
assessments of multiple scenarios and comparisons between scenarios. Since respondents are 
asked to make judgments about scenarios including multiple cues, the policy-capturing study 
reduces, to some extent, the possibility for respondents to give strategic answers (Karren and 
Barringer 2002).   
 
The policy-capturing design furthermore allowed us to study different combinations of stimuli 
and multiple decisions, whereas traditional experimental designs can only study a limited 
amount of decisions. Moreover, the policy-capturing design provides a relatively high degree 
of control over confounding factors, because of its full factorial design. Because respondents in 
our study evaluated all possible combinations of the different cue values, the independent 
effects of each value could be assessed. Within traditional experiments, there typically is more 
uncertainty regarding possible other explanatory factors (Aiman-Smith et al. 2002).  
 
Design and scenario construction  
Each scenario entailed a value of the four cues (quality of bookkeeping, quality of interaction, 
level of education and social class). This study employed a full factorial design, which resulted 
in a total amount of 36 scenarios (2x2x3x3). Each respondent was asked to evaluate 40 
scenarios, including four duplicated scenarios. Whereas reliability is a necessary condition for 
the validity of measures, Karren and Barringer (2002) noted that few published policy-capturing 
studies analyzed the reliability of evaluators’ judgments. The authors recommend that 
replicating four scenarios may serve as feasible test-retest check of the judgments. Our 9:1 
scenario-to-cue ratio meets the minimum ratio of 5:1 as suggested by Cooksey (1996). The 
scenarios were presented in narrative form. In order not to exhaust our respondents, we 
constructed the scenarios in such a way as to only include the necessary information needed to 
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make a judgment. We undertook 10 test interviews to improve our scenarios and 
operationalization of cues, aiming for an optimal balance between realism and feasibility. 
Appendix A presents an example of a scenario used.  
 
Cue development and operationalization  
For each cue we developed several behavioral statements that represented different levels of 
the respective cue. The choice for these values is based on our prior in-depth study on signals 
of entrepreneurs’ trustworthiness and untrustworthiness (Raaphorst and Groeneveld 2015), and 
also on 10 test interviews with tax officials. During these interviews it was assessed how 
statements were interpreted, which were refined or adjusted aided by respondents’ input. With 
regards to entrepreneurs’ level of education, we chose to explicitly state the level of education 
(either low or high) as an impression acquired during the audit, since that is typically the way 
officials express their sense of an entrepreneurs’ cognitive abilities. 
 
The concept of social class is broader than socioeconomic class, since it not only refers to 
people’s economic position in society, but also more broadly to sociocultural aspects such as 
lifestyle and behaviors (e.g. Harrits and Møller 2014). In this study, we distinguished between 
a low and a middle-high social class. At first we tested a cue distinguishing between two known 
areas within the respective cities where the enterprise allegedly was located, of which one was 
known for its socioeconomic problems and the other was in the wealthier city center. However, 
since the areas were not known to all respondents, we had to develop other indicators. Therefore 
we chose to present pictures of streets where the enterprises allegedly were located. The pictures 
indicating a lower social class show multicultural streets with dilapidated buildings and poorly 
kept streets, whereas the pictures indicating a higher social class show well-kept streets, with 
well-maintained buildings and mainly white pedestrians. 
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For both quality of bookkeeping and quality of interaction we developed three levels, ranging 
from low to high quality. For the statistical analyses, the cues ‘quality of bookkeeping’ and 
‘quality of interaction’ were dummy coded. The lowest levels of these cues were used as 
reference categories. For the three dependent variables – assessment of trustworthiness, overall 
judgment of the situation and intention to more critically scrutinize – we developed three items. 
See appendix B for the operationalization of all our variables. Table 1 shows the descriptive 
statistics for the dependent variables. The correlations of the independent and dependent 
variables can be found in appendix C. Although the dependent variables are highly correlated, 
the subsequent analyses are performed for each dependent variable separately, because they 
measure different judgments; ‘appears okay’ captures a general impression of the situation, 
‘trust’ measures an interpersonal judgment and ‘more critical scrutinization’ measures a 
behavioral intention.  
Table 1. Descriptive statistics dependent variables 
 N Mean SD 
Evaluation ‘appears 
okay’ 
828 3,11 1,428 
Evaluation ‘trust’ 828 3,26 1,297 
Evaluation ‘more 
critical scrutinization’ 
828 5,13 1,279 
 
 
Respondent selection and data collection procedure 
In line with the aim of this study, we selected respondents who work with the ‘horizontal 
supervision’ policy and have face-to-face contact with entrepreneurs as part of their work. 
Managers of two different tax offices in two cities in the south of the Netherlands were 
approached, and both were willing to cooperate with us by requesting their employees to 
participate in our research. 36 respondents were willing to participate. With 10 of those we 
conducted a test interview and with 26 we conducted the final study. For all the statistical 
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analyses we only included respondents who had reliable response patterns, i.e. a correlation 
between the replicated and original scenarios of above .50 (p<0.10). This resulted in a dataset 
with 23 respondents and 828 evaluated scenarios in total. Each row in our dataset represented 
an evaluated scenario. Five of the 23 respondents are female, 18 are male. Only one respondent 
was born in a non-western country. With regards to tenure at the time of data collection, four 
respondents had been in service for 3 years or less, eight respondents had been employed by 
the tax administration between 10 and 30 years, and 11 respondents had been in service for over 
30 years.  
 
Because the evaluation task requires respondents to invest time and effort, we decided to 
conduct the study within an one-on-one interview setting. In doing this, we could invest in the 
relationship with respondents, and enhance their motivation to participate. The first author 
conducted all the interviews, and the same procedure was followed within each interview. Small 
breaks were introduced at fixed times, to prevent respondents from getting exhausted (see 
online appendix for the interview procedure). After the evaluation task, respondents had the 
opportunity to reflect upon their experiences. This also offered us the opportunity to assess how 
respondents interpreted certain indicators and questions. These interviews made clear that the 
photos indicating low and middle-high social class were interpreted as intended.  
 
Findings  
In what follows, we will first describe the patterns of scenario evaluation found at the individual 
level. Second, we will test our hypotheses by multi-level analyses. Thirdly, we will use our 
reflection interview data to interpret the findings that were inconsistent with our hypotheses.   
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Individual-level exploration 
In order to explore the scenario evaluations, we first conducted quantitative analyses at the 
individual level. IBM SPSS (version 24) was used for the analyses. We explored the direct and 
interaction effects on the evaluations for each respondent separately, by conducting analyses of 
variance. Differences across respondents were found in the patterns of direct and interaction 
effects involving the two status characteristics. For only five of the 23 respondents, 
entrepreneurs’ level of education had a significant direct effect on one or several of the 
evaluations. No significant relations were found between social class and respondents’ 
evaluations. 
 
For five respondents, significant moderation effects were found. These interactions all involve 
a moderating effect of level of education on the relationship between a value of either quality 
of bookkeeping or quality of interaction with one of the evaluations. The directions of these 
interaction effects differed across respondents. This means that, depending on the respondent, 
cues of quality of bookkeeping and quality of interaction were evaluated either more negatively 
or more positively for the lower educated entrepreneur. We can conclude from this first 
exploration that for the majority of respondents no direct and interaction effects of status 
characteristics seemed to be at play. However, since the same analysis was repeated 23 times, 
the five significant interaction effects found could also have occurred by chance. Because the 
evaluated scenarios are nested within respondents (and observations are thus not independent), 
multilevel analyses were required. We estimated a maximum likelihood random intercepts, 
fixed slopes model. We allowed respondents to vary on the dependent variables ‘trust’, ‘appears 
okay’ and ‘more critical scrutinization’ at baseline from one another. In this model, the slopes 
were fixed, since we are interested in the effects of the cues (level-one units) and their 
interactions and not in whether these effects differ among respondents (our level-two units). 
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Since our explanatory variables are not defined at level two, and statistical inference is only 
directed at respondents in our sample, a fixed effect model is appropriate (Snijders and Berkhof 
2007). Moreover, fixed effects estimates ‘achieve a better control for unexplained differences 
between level-two units’ (Snijders and Berkhof 2007, p. 143).  
 
Multi-level analyses 
Table 2 presents the results of the multilevel analyses of the direct effects of the cues and the 
interaction effects involving the two status characteristics on all three dependent variables. For 
each dependent variable, we also tested an empty model to model the random effect of 
respondent. For the dependent variable ‘appears okay’ the intraclass correlation was 0.1232 
(0.251/(0.251+1.786) which indicates that around 12% of the variation in the evaluation is 
accounted for by the respondents. For ‘trust’ this correlation was 0.1892 (0.318/(0.318+1.363) 
which indicates that around 19% of the variation in accounted for by respondents. The intraclass 
correlation for ‘more critical scrutinization’ was 0.1053 (0.172/(0.172+1.462); around 11% of 
the variation is explained by respondents. For all three dependent variables, the significant 
estimates of variance indicate that the intercepts vary significantly across respondents. Hence, 
a multilevel analysis is warranted. 
 
Model 1 added the four cues. In line with hypothesis 1, both ‘missing invoices’ and ‘invoices 
in order’ have a positive effect on the evaluation of the overall situation when compared to 
‘barely any records’. For ‘more critical scrunitization’ these effects are negative and also 
statistically significant; the results indicate that the worse the quality of the bookkeeping, the 
more respondents are inclined to more critically scrutinize the entrepreneur. Regarding the 
quality of interaction, ‘to the point’ has a positive effect on ‘appears okay’ and ‘trust’ when 
compared to ‘avoids contact’. Contrary to our expectation, ‘dodging around question’ has a 
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negative effect on ‘appears okay’ and ‘trust’ when compared to ‘avoids contact’, but this effect 
is not significant. Again, for ‘more critical scrutinization’ these effects are reversed. This means 
that respondents are less inclined to more critically scrutinize the entrepreneur when s/he gives 
to the point answers, than when s/he avoids contact. ‘Dodging around question’ has a slightly 
more positive effect than ‘avoids contact’, but this effect is not significant. There were no 
significant direct effects of level of education and social class on each of the evaluations. For 
‘appears okay’, adding the four cues accounts for 55.4% of the within respondent variability, 
and resulted in a significantly better fit of the model; the deviance decreased with 649,248 
(df=6; p<0.001). For ‘trust’, 42.8% of the within respondent variability is explained by the cues. 
The deviance decreased significantly with 450,153 (df=6, p<0.001). Adding the four variables 
accounts for 50.4% of the within respondent variability in ‘more critical scrutinization’. The 
deviance decreased significantly with 564,214 (df=6, p <0.001). 
 
Model 2 added the interaction effects in order to test whether values of quality of bookkeeping 
or quality of interaction were evaluated differently for status group entrepreneurs. Overall, one 
significant interaction effect was found for ‘appears okay’; ‘dodging around question’ seems to 
be differently evaluated for lower educated entrepreneurs than for higher educated 
entrepreneurs. For ‘trust’ and ‘more critical scrutinization’ no significant interaction effects 
were found. Contrary to our hypotheses, no significant interaction effects were found for social 
class. For none of the dependent variables, model 2 led to a significantly better fit of the model. 
In order to check whether adding the significant interaction effect alone would increase the fit 
of the model for ‘appears okay’, we checked whether a new model with only the direct effects 
and the significant interaction effect would significantly decrease variance. In this new model 
-2 Log Likelihood was 2218,53, and X2-change was -3,511 compared to model 1. This model 
significantly improved the fit (df=1, p<0.10). 
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Table 2. Multilevel analyses of direct and interaction effects 
 DV: Appears okay DV: Trust DV: More critical 
scrutinization 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Intercept 2.030*** 
(0.137) 
2.076*** 
(0.163) 
2.450*** 
(0.145) 
2.494*** 
(0.169) 
5.978*** 
(0.120) 
5.940*** 
(0.146) 
Cues        
Quality of bookkeeping                              
 Barely any records Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref 
Invoices missing 0.406*** 
(0.076) 
0.428*** 
(0.131) 
0.330*** 
(0.075) 
0.337** 
(0.130) 
-0.283*** 
(0.072) 
-0.348** 
(0.125) 
Invoices in order 2.087*** 
(0.076) 
2.072*** 
(0.131) 
1.406*** 
(0.075) 
1.312*** 
(0.130) 
-1.801*** 
(0.072) 
-0.176*** 
(0.125) 
Quality of interaction                                                                             
                 Avoids contact  Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref 
Dodges around question -0.054 
(0.076) 
-0.192 
(0.131) 
-0.083 
(0.075) 
-0.141 
(0.130) 
0.083 
(0.072) 
0.199 
(0.125) 
To the point 0.775*** 
(0.076) 
0.768*** 
(0.131) 
0.917*** 
(0.075) 
0.931*** 
(0.130) 
-0.591*** 
(0.072) 
-0.562*** 
(0.125) 
Level of education                                                               
                                  Low Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref 
High 0.053 
(0.062) 
-0.075 
(0.138) 
-0.087 
(0.061) 
-0.138 
(0.137) 
-0.017 
(0.059) 
0.053 
(0.132) 
Social class                                                           
Low Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref 
High -0.043 
(0.062) 
-0.007 
(0.138) 
-0.014 
(0.061) 
-0.050 
(0.137) 
0.051 
(0.059) 
0.058 
(0.132) 
Two-way interactions        
Invoices missing*  
level of education 
̶ 0.014 
(0.152) 
̶ -0.036 
(0.150) 
̶ 0.087 
(0.145) 
Invoices in order* 
 level of education 
̶ 0.130 
(0.152) 
̶ 0.145 
(0.150) 
̶ -0.094 
(0.145) 
Dodges around question* 
level of education 
̶ 0.254 † 
(0.152) 
̶ 0.138 
(0.150) 
̶ -0.210 
(0.145) 
To the point*  
level of education 
̶ 0.014 
(0.152) 
̶ -0.094 
(0.150) 
̶ 0.007 
(0.145) 
Invoices missing*  
social class 
̶ -0.029 
(0.152) 
̶ 0.022 
(0.150) 
̶ 0.043 
(0.145) 
Invoices in order*  
social class 
̶ -0.101 
(0.152) 
̶ 0.043 
(0.150) 
̶ 0.022 
(0.145) 
Dodges around question* 
social class 
̶ 0.022 
(0.152) 
̶ -0.022 
(0.150) 
̶ -0.021 
(0.145) 
To the point*  
social class 
̶ 0.000 
(0.152) 
̶ 0.065 
(0.150) 
̶ -0.065 
(0.145) 
-2 Log Likelihood 2222,041 2216,909 2207,449 2202,954 2137,851 2133,073 
Df 9 17 9 17 9 17 
X2-change in comparison 
to previous model 
-649,248*** -5,132 -450,153*** -5,222 -564,214*** -4,778 
Variance within 
respondents 
0.797*** 0.792*** 0.779*** 0.775*** 0.725*** 0.721*** 
% explained variance  55.4% 55.7% 42.8% 43.1% 50.4% 50.7% 
Variance between 
respondents 
0.279** 0.279** 0.334*** 0.334*** 0.193** 0.193** 
% explained variance 25.0% 26.1% 30.0% 30.1% 21.0% 21.1% 
N (scenarios) 828 828 828 828 828 828 
N (respondents) 23 23 23 23 23 23 
Note: standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels:  † p ≤ 0.10; ** p ≤ 0.01; *** p ≤ 0.001 
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Figure 2 plots the significant interaction effect and shows that, in line with our hypothesis, a 
lower educated entrepreneur is judged slightly more negatively when dodging around a question 
than a higher educated entrepreneur. When an entrepreneur is avoiding contact, this is evaluated 
slightly more positive when s/he is a lower educated entrepreneur, than when s/he is higher 
educated. Whereas there is no significant direct effect of level of education, there is a 
significant, moderating effect of level of education. The difference is small relative to the scale 
on which the dependent variable is measured (smaller than .2 on a 7-point scale). However, the 
difference is larger when compared to the variance of 2.039 of ‘Appears Okay’, indicating a 
tight distribution of scores. 
 
Figure 2. Graph of interaction effect Dodging around question * Level of education on 
‘appears okay’  
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Interview data  
The subsequent interview allowed us to gain insight in how respondents experienced evaluating 
the scenarios, and how the cues and questions were interpreted. Generally, respondents 
experienced no difficulty in evaluating the scenarios. Some respondents noted that the scenarios 
looked like each other, and that reality is more complex. In reality, for instance, they also look 
at what people say and not only at how the interaction unfolds. Yet, the presented cues gave 
them sufficient grounds to make evaluations. Also, some respondents mentioned their response 
pattern became less extreme throughout the evaluation task.  
 
We moreover relied on the interview data to provide possible explanations for the findings that 
were inconsistent with our hypotheses. Contrary to our hypothesis, we found that when an 
entrepreneur is avoiding contact, this is evaluated slightly more positive when s/he is a lower 
educated entrepreneur, than when s/he is higher educated. A statement by one of our 
respondents could offer an explanation for this. He argued that when a lower educated person 
does not seek contact this could have to do with insecurity, whereas a higher educated person 
has better interpersonal skills and is less insecure. As a consequence, the official starts to ‘get 
suspicious’ when a higher educated entrepreneur avoids contact. In this case, a higher 
expectation leads to a stricter evaluation when evidence for low competence is encountered 
than in case of low expectations. This could be a possible explanation for our ‘reversed double 
standards’ finding.  
 
Moreover, some respondents mentioned they deliberately tried not to look at the photos and/or 
entrepreneurs’ level of education. One respondent for instance argues that the photos may lead 
to expectations, and ‘you look at it, but you try to block it’. Another respondent argued he 
learned to suppress his first impressions, in order to be as neutral as possible. Again other 
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respondents argued that one needs to be careful with presumptions, since they do not have to 
be true. Some say these aspects are not supposed to play a role and are not really relevant, but 
that they sometimes do give a first impression. One respondent mentioned he tries to be aware 
of his own prejudices, and always tries to postpone first impressions, but that he does not want 
to be naïve either. Although trying to be nonbiased, most respondents at the same time 
associated specific expectations to either lower or higher status groups. E.g. ‘I expect more 
from the higher educated, and less from the lower educated’, or ‘the higher educated rather have 
a negative impact; they are more able to cheat than the lower educated’. This indicates that 
although some respondents learned to block their prejudices or postpone their first impressions, 
they can involuntary play a role. Respondents who argued they tried to not to let themselves be 
influenced by presuppositions or prejudices, likely also try to do this in their actual work. This 
may be an explanation for the nonsignificant interaction effects.  
 
Conclusion and discussion  
This study examined whether officials use double standards in evaluating entrepreneurs during 
inspections. It provided a first step in testing the explanatory potential of the sociological double 
standards theory in a public administration context. Using a policy-capturing design, this study 
tested whether situations involving entrepreneurs with a lower level of education and from a 
lower social class are evaluated more negatively than similar situations involving entrepreneurs 
with a higher level of education and from a higher social class. Our hypotheses were partly 
confirmed. Most values of quality of interaction and quality of bookkeeping, except for dodging 
around the question, had a significant effect on the evaluations. With regards to the double 
standards propositions, we found that when a lower educated entrepreneur dodges around a 
question this is evaluated slightly more negatively than when a higher educated entrepreneur 
dodges around a question. We also found evidence for the reversed practice: when a higher 
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educated entrepreneur avoids contact this is evaluated slightly more negatively than when a 
lower educated entrepreneur avoids contact. This finding underlines the importance of studying 
indirect mechanisms of stereotyping, especially since we did not find any direct effect of status 
characteristics on the evaluations.  
 
Whereas our prior qualitative study (Raaphorst and Groeneveld 2015) suggested tax officials 
may use double standards, most of the interaction effects in this study were nonsignificant. 
When compared to the direct effects of most of the cues, the significant interaction effect is 
moreover only small in size. This is not surprising since quality of bookkeeping and quality of 
interaction are deemed essential for evaluating the acceptability of tax returns, while 
entrepreneurs’ level of education is not. More interestingly, whereas we did not find any direct 
effect of level of education on the evaluations, we did find it could affect frontline evaluation 
in combination with other signals. These differences can have a large impact on the further 
evolvement of an inspection and decisions being made. It could make a difference between 
giving someone the benefit of the doubt or not. This frontline practice may harm equal 
treatment, and have lasting consequences for citizen-clients.  
 
Our findings have several theoretical implications. First, they show that stereotyping by 
frontline officials could work more indirectly than is hitherto assumed within the street-level 
bureaucracy literature. Studies have shown that street-level bureaucrats rely on stereotypes in 
decision making as a way of coping with time pressures and high workloads (Lipsky 1980; 
Andersen and Guul 2016). These studies suggest citizen-clients’ belonging to social groups 
serve as shortcuts to their supposed identities. Our study indicates that frontline officials employ 
an indirect way of stereotyping in which citizen-clients’ belonging to a social group serves as 
frame that influences the interpretation of other signals. In fact, our analyses have shown that 
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entrepreneurs’ level of education does not have a direct effect on the evaluations, but has an 
effect on one of the evaluations in combination with another signal. This subtler way of 
stereotyping calls for research approaches that take into account how officials interpret clusters 
of signals.  
 
Our study has furthermore found evidence for the use of double standards in different 
directions. Findings point out that the standards can be stricter for the low status entrepreneur 
and more lenient for the high status entrepreneur, or the other way around. In this study, 
‘avoiding contact’ was evaluated stricter for higher educated entrepreneurs, whereas ‘dodging 
around question’ was evaluated stricter for lower educated entrepreneurs. In line with our 
double standards proposition, not giving answers to questions may be interpreted stricter for 
lower educated entrepreneurs because it is consistent with the lower expectations officials have 
of their competences. A possible explanation for the finding that works in the opposite direction 
could be that inferences about different properties are made for the different status groups. Our 
qualitative data suggests that a lower educated entrepreneur who avoids contact is associated 
with mere incompetence in communicating, whereas this is seen as a signal for bad intentions 
for higher educated entrepreneurs, who are expected to have these communication skills. Foschi 
(2000) refers to the latter as ‘reversed double standards’, which has been advocated by some as 
a means to change the status quo. Although this might be experienced and proposed by officials 
as more fair, it reinforces the assumption that lower status citizen-clients cannot meet the 
universalistic standards and therefore have to be treated more leniently (ibid.). Either way – in 
receiving a stricter or more lenient treatment – lower status groups are treated as inferior.  
 
Following up on our findings, future research should examine how organizational socialization 
of public officials affects their use of double standards. Especially since some respondents 
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suggested they have learned to block prejudices or postpone their first impressions, there are 
indications that organizational socialization may work to neutralize the effects of stereotypical 
expectations and concomitant double standards. In fact, taking into account the influence of 
organizational socialization, but also other background characteristics of public officials, on the 
use of double standards, would contribute to the development of a theory aimed at explaining 
the extent to which double standards are used.  
 
Our findings also have implications for new models of governance that have come to embrace 
street-level officials’ professional judgments as essential for decision making. Within models 
promoting trust between officials and citizens, officials have to work with rules and legislation 
that grant them more discretion to rely on their own interpretations in decision making. Within 
our case, the question has shifted from ‘is it correct?’ to ‘is it acceptable?’, thereby allowing 
officials to look at entrepreneurs’ demeanor and at whether they appear trustworthy. Our study 
has shown that, in such a context, officials sometimes use double standards in evaluating 
citizen-clients. Whereas these new governance models allow frontline officials to be more 
responsive and – in our case – to get citizen-clients more compliant, this way of working may 
also have implications for consistent and equal decision making (see also Piore 2011; Rutz et 
al. 2015).  
 
This study’s approach to examining stereotyping moreover has different advantages but also 
drawbacks when compared to experimental research designs using control and treatment 
groups. Recent experimental studies have found evidence for direct effects of stereotypes, such 
as ethnicity, on decision making (e.g. Andersen and Guul 2016). We did not find such direct 
effects. Rather than making statements about which findings are more true, it is more fruitful 
to reflect on the implications of using different methods. Whereas the classical experiments do 
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primarily measure officials’ first stereotypical reactions, the question remains whether these 
studies actually capture officials’ judgments in work situations, or their first impressions as 
human beings. Policy-capturing studies probably resemble officials’ actual work situations 
better, since such designs allow for assessments of multiple scenarios and comparisons between 
scenarios. As such, respondents have more opportunity to reflect on their first impressions and 
adjust their responses accordingly. However, this seems to accord with officials’ daily practice 
in which they try not to rely on their prejudices. An interesting venue for future research would 
be to analyze whether and how officials try to make their decisions consistent with prior 
decisions, by specifically looking at carry-over effects.  
 
This study also has some limitations. First, this study does not allow for generalization to a 
larger population. We only had a small sample that was not selected on grounds of 
representativeness for a larger population. Yet, our main aim was to theoretically generalize: 
we tested the validity of the double standards theory in a new context, that is, street-level 
decision making. It is highly likely that our main finding that in some occasions officials use 
double standards is generalizable to comparable frontline domains where rules and guidelines 
have become less clear-cut and there is more room for officials’ interpretation. Second, because 
we had many conditions and only a small sample, we could not control for possible order 
effects. Therefore we kept the scenario order constant for each respondent. By using larger 
samples and less conditions future research could disentangle cue effects from possible order 
effects by randomizing the order of scenarios. 
 
Third, the way cues were operationalized could have impacted our findings. Level of education 
as a signal for competence, for example, was given as an impression acquired through the 
inspection, and not measured by more implicit indicators. This could have raised respondents’ 
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awareness about the focus of our study. Using more fine-grained indicators for level of 
education could have resulted in better identifying interaction effects. Our cue of social class, 
as a signal for intentions, furthermore, portrayed not only indicators of wealth and maintenance 
of streets, but also of ethnicity. While these often tend to go together, they are not the same. 
Our cue thereby grasped a broader stereotype around social class. Future research could 
disentangle these indicators and measure the effects of social class and ethnicity separately.  
 
Fourth, because respondents were asked to evaluate a fairly large amount of scenarios, 
respondents learned about their own response patterns and the manipulated cues, and could 
have adjusted their responses accordingly. Although this learning effect may indeed have 
occurred, this probably resembles tax officials’ daily practice where they have to inspect 
multiple cases on a monthly and sometimes weekly basis, and compare cases to make consistent 
decisions. Hence, within an experimental research design where respondents only evaluate one 
scenario, it is likely that there would be more and stronger evidence for the use double 
standards. Yet, findings of such experiments are less generalizable to real-life settings, where 
officials attempt to make consistent and fair decisions. Moreover, since our study still found 
evidence for the use of double standards, it is likely that the amount of information in vignettes 
made it difficult to give strategic answers and that the trust established in the one-on-one setting 
made respondents feel comfortable in making honest evaluations. Future studies on frontline 
stereotyping could compare different methods, such as policy-capturing and experiments with 
treatment and control groups, to study similar research questions. In doing this, the specific 
contributions of each method to the study of stereotyping could be assessed and compared. 
 
This study has shown the added value of using a policy-capturing design to examine officials’ 
implicit use of stereotypes in decision making without stripping it of the broader decision 
30 
 
making context. However, while the study resembles real-life settings, the scenarios are still 
hypothetical and compromise the complexity of real-life frontline decision making. Scholars 
interested in studying indirect stereotyping could consider conducting field experiments, which 
typically have better external validity. However, such studies are more difficult to conduct. 
Either way, this study has suggested that citizen-clients’ status characteristics may affect the 
standards officials use to interpret information, without necessarily affecting their evaluations 
directly. This finding calls for research approaches and methods that are able to grasp this 
indirect, but pervasive, form of stereotyping.   
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Appendix A – Scenario example  
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Appendix B – Operationalization  
Cues – behavioral statements and pictures  
Quality of bookkeeping 
1. You notice that hardly any records are kept  
2. You notice that some invoices are missing from the records  
3. You notice that the invoices in the records are numbered consecutively and continuously 
Quality of interaction  
1. The entrepreneur avoids contact with you  
2. The entrepreneur talks around your questions 
3. The entrepreneur answers your questions to the point  
Level of education  
1. You’ve the impression that the entrepreneur is lower educated 
2. You’ve the impression that the entrepreneur is higher educated  
Social class*  
1. Photo 1, 2, 3 & 4 
2. Photo 5, 6, 7 & 8 
 
Photo 1 
 
Photo 2 
 
                                                          
* Photo 4 and 8 have been downloaded from the website Flickr and are royalty free. The other photos have been 
bought at a website that allows use for non-commercial purposes.   
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Photo 3 
 
Photo 4 
 
Source photo: Flickr, made by FaceMePLS 
Photo 5 
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Photo 6 
 
Photo 7 
 
Photo 8 
 
Source photo: Flickr, made by Stipo Team for Urban Development 
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Dependent variables – items (7-point Likert scale: totally disagree – totally agree)   
Trust evaluation  
I think the entrepreneur can be trusted  
Overall evaluation 
It seems fine here  
Intended behavior  
I would more critically look at this entrepreneur 
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Appendix C – Correlation matrix  
 
 
V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 V7 V8 V9  
V1: Appears 
okay 
 
̶         
V2: Trust 
 
 
,812** ̶        
V3: More 
critical 
scrutinization 
,794** ,724** ̶       
V4: Dummy 
missing invoices 
 
,211** ,136** ,228** ̶      
V5: Dummy 
invoices in order 
  
,622** ,451** ,612** ,500** ̶     
V6: Dummy 
dodge around 
question  
,146** ,197** ,140** ,000 ,000 ̶    
V7 Dummy to 
the point 
 
,265** ,348** ,233** ,000 ,000 ,500** ̶   
V8: Level of 
education 
 
,019 -,034 -,007 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 ̶  
V9: Social class 
 
  
-,015 -,006 ,020 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 ̶ 
** p < 0.01. 
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Online appendix – Interview procedure  
Step 1 – introduction and background questions  
 
Introduction  
a) Introducing myself and general topic of research  
b) Guaranteeing anonymity of data processing and confidentiality  
c) Explanation of procedure  
 
Background questions  
a) When started as tax official? How? 
b) What kind of job before that?  
 
Instructions given   
a) The scenarios describe audits. Although they resemble real audits, they are different because 
there is less information. We believe that inspectors are able to make assessments based on 
these scenarios. The scenarios look alike, but are different. Please read them carefully and 
look at the pictures.  
b) Because there is only concise information, we don’t ask you to make a final judgment. It’s 
rather a provisional assessment based on your first impression/feeling. We know there are 
other aspects you would commonly further investigate that could shed a whole different light 
on the case. We are not interested in that. Only take the mentioned information into 
consideration. 
c) We want to emphasize that we are really interested in your first impression, and not in what 
other people might expect, or in what you think you should do. We’re looking for honest 
answers. We’re not testing whether you do something good or wrong in this research. 
d) Please fill out the scenarios yourself. We can discuss possible questions or doubts afterwards. 
If you doubt about something, try to fill out the questions based on your own impression.  
Halfway, we’ll stop for 5 minutes and I’ll ask you some background questions.  
e) Try not to think too long before giving your answers; we’re interested in your first 
impression.   
 
Step 2 –  first 20 scenarios 
 
Researcher distanced herself, and made notes on: 
a) Atmosphere of interview (open/closed; signals of fatigue) 
b) Time respondents took to fill out first 20 scenarios  
c) Questions and remarks respondent had (were only answered and discussed during reflection) 
 
Step 3 – background questions (around 5 minutes)  
 
Background questions 
a) Function? Specialization? 
b) What kind of taxes?  
c) Projects?  
 
Step 4 – last 20 scenarios  
 
Researcher distanced herself, and made notes on: 
a) Atmosphere of interview (open/closed; signals of fatigue) 
b) Time respondents took to fill out last 20 scenarios  
c) Questions and remarks respondent had (were only answered and discussed during reflection) 
 
Step 5 – reflection and disclosing more about study  
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Reflection  
a) How is evaluation task experienced? Difficult/easy? 
i. Researcher made notes on how respondent interpreted certain cues/questions. 
 
Disclosing of cues  
a) How to rank-order these cues so it reflects the importance these aspects play in getting a first 
impression in still uncertain situations (as described in scenarios)?  
i. Researcher made notes when sensing possible desirable answering to scenarios.  
 
Step 6 – small questionnaire and wrapping up 
 
Small questionnaire 
a) Propensity to trust; Level of education; Country of origin 
 
Wrapping up  
a) Thank you and small thank you gift  
b) Informing about presentation of findings  
 
 
 
 
